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Abstract
This paper develops a pragmatic analysis of  the decision of  the European 
Court of  Human Rights, ruling upholding the French ban on the wearing in 
public of  any piece of  clothing designed to fully conceal the face (case S.A.S. 
v France, 2014). For this purpose, the pragmatic method of  the founder of  
the Pragmatism C. S. Peirce is initially used to criticize the deductive logic 
argument developed by the majority of  the Court (15 votes), based on the 
abstract principle of  “living together” as an element of  the protection of  
the rights and freedom of  others. Then, the Pragmatic abduction reasoning 
of  Peirce, the Logic of  Consequences of  Holmes Jr and Dewey’s experi-
mental logic were used to revise the arguments of  the two dissident judges’ 
on the case, in order to highlight the conceivable effects of  the decision. In 
correlation, Dewey’s political philosophy is recovered to inquire the fallacies 
of  the majority Court arguments based on ‘stimulating social interactions’ in 
a democratic society.  Interaction together with the principle of  continuity 
represent one of  the milestones of  the pragmatic philosophy of  Dewey. 
Both are social and political tools indispensable to exam the conditions of  
possibility of  preserving the values of  an open and democratic society.  In 
this sense, the Dewey’s concepts of  continuity and interaction help to un-
derstand what should be the pragmatic meaning of  “living together in a de-
mocratic society” in opposition to the Court majority decision that did not 
face the religious and cultural dimensions related to the problem. 
Keywords: European Court. Experimental Logic. Human Rights. Philoso-
phical Pragmatism. Legal Pragmatism. 
Resumo
Este artigo desenvolve uma análise pragmática da decisão do Tribunal Euro-
peu dos Direitos Humanos, que decidiu manter a proibição francesa do uso 
em público de qualquer peça do vestuário concebida para cobrir totalmen-
te o rosto (processo S.A.S. v França, 2014). Para este propósito, o método 
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pragmático do fundador do Pragmatismo C S Peirce é 
inicialmente usado para criticar o argumento da lógica 
dedutiva elaborada pela maioria da Corte (15 votos), 
baseado no princípio abstrato de “viver junto” como 
um elemento de proteção de direitos e da liberdade de 
outros. Então, o raciocínio pragmático da abdução de 
Peirce, a lógica das consequências de Holmes Jr e a lógi-
ca experimental de Dewey foram usados  para revisar os 
argumentos dos dois juízes dissidentes sobre o caso, a 
fim de destacar os efeitos concebíveis da decisão. Em 
correlação, a filosofia política de Dewey é recuperada 
para investigar as falácias da maioria dos argumentos 
da Corte embasados em “estimular interações sociais” 
em uma sociedade democrática. A interação junto com 
o princípio da continuidade representam um dos mar-
cos da filosofia pragmática de Dewey. Ambas são ferra-
mentas sociais e políticas indispensáveis  para examinar 
as condições de possibilidade de preservar os valores de 
uma sociedade aberta e democrática. Nesse sentido, os 
conceitos de continuidade e interação de Dewey ajudam 
a entender qual deve ser o significado pragmático de 
“conviver em uma sociedade democrática”, em oposição 
à decisão da maioria da Corte que não enfrentou as di-
mensões religiosas e culturais relacionadas ao problema. 
Palavras-chaves: Corte Europeia. Lógica experimen-
tal. Direitos Humanos. Pragmatismo Filosófico. Prag-
matismo Jurídico.
1 Introduction 
The Logic of  Pragmatism will be taken as the me-
thodological instrument to interpret the decision of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights in its ruling uphol-
ding the French ban on the wearing in public of  any 
piece of  clothing designed to fully conceal the face (case 
of  S.A.S. v. France, judgment delivered on 1 July 2014). 
Then, methodologically, the philosophical pragmatic 
approach of  C. S. Peirce, J. Dewey and the legal concep-
tions of  O. W. Holmes Jr. will be used to explore logical 
reasoning and the social and political consequences of  
the Court’s legal adjudication. 
The European Court considered that the French 
Law does not violate articles 8 and 9 of  the European 
Convention of  Human Rights respectively: the right to 
respect for private and family life and freedom of  thou-
ght, conscience and religion. The majority of  Court (15 
votes) found that “the ban imposed by the law of  11 
October can be regarded as proportionate to the aim 
pursued, namely the preservation of  the conditions of  
“living together” as an element of  the “protection of  
the rights and freedoms of  others”.
On the other hand, the dissent judges (2 votes) argu-
ment that the decision “sacrifices individual rights far-
-reaching prohibition and touching upon the right to 
one´s own cultural and religious identity”. So, for them, 
the recurring motives for not tolerating the full-face veil 
are based on interpretations of  its symbolic meanings.
The argumentative strategy chosen by the majority 
of  Court in order to justify its decision was a somehow 
surprising one, and consisted substantially, on the one 
hand, in subtly dodging the more crucial claims (made 
by the French and the Belgian Governments and objec-
ted by the claimant and the third parties) that the wea-
ring of  the burqa or the niqab in public was contrary to 
the “legitimate aims” of  public safety, gender equality 
and human dignity, and, on the other hand, in acknow-
ledging the existence of  the fundamental “right to live 
in a space of  socialisation which makes living together 
easier”, as derived from the legitimate aim of  the “pro-
tection of  the rights and freedoms of  others”.
Behind of  the apparent scene of  the liberal and demo-
cratic decision of  the European Court in dealing with the 
relationships between the European tradition of  Human 
Rights and the Islamic culture, characterized by strong re-
ligious compromise, emerges the major problems of  the 
mentioned decision of  the Court. It represents a sample 
of  the still existing prejudices between these different 
cultural environments.  On the other hand, the logic of  
legal reasoning based upon a methodology of  Positivis-
tic deductive syllogism (Logic of  Antecedents) has acted 
as barriers to a more flexible interpretation of  problems 
of  such a nature. The deductive logic of  the legal deci-
sion exposition is different from the experimental logic 
of  Pragmatism (Logic of  Consequences).  To better un-
derstand this problem it seems relevant to appeal to the 
logic of  abduction as a therapy to clarify these conflicts 
through the Logic of  Consequences. The form of  the 
abductive reasoning was given by the following Peirce’s 
expression: “The surprising fact, C, is observed; but if  A 
were true, C would be a matter of  course, Hence, there is 
reason to suspect that A is true”1.
1 PEIRCE, Charles S.  Pragmatism and abduction. Editor Artur Burks. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934. p.117. (Collected Pa-
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So, Peirce pointed out that the rule for attaining the 
third grade of  clearness is to take into consideration the 
conceivable effects that have practical bearings2. (How 
to Make our Ideas Clear)
Dewey represents the pragmatic philosopher who 
methodologically interpreted the interactions between 
the individual and his community, and how these inte-
ractions could be channelized towards the construction 
of  a genuine democratic society. It is relevant to obser-
ve how the decision of  the European Court  – object 
of  this study – emphasized, as fundamental to its in-
terpretation, the notion of  socializing spaces as a pos-
sibility towards a more functional and peaceful social 
interaction. O. W. Holmes Jr. brings to the problem the 
legal pragmatic contribution through his aphorism, ac-
cording to which the life of  Law has not been logic but 
experience3. In this case, Holmes’ ideas seem to put into 
question the Logic of  Antecedents inherent to the de-
cision of  the European Court. Moreover, from a prag-
matic point of  view, it is necessary to examine whether 
the wearing of  the burqa or niqab in public can cause 
the so-called “clear and imminent hazard” that serves as 
limit the freedom of  speech and expression of  thought. 
It is, therefore, a decision which being pure formalist, 
becomes a fertile ground for pragmatic critical analysis.
In summary, the aim of  this paper consists in articu-
lating the logical of  scientific inquiry developed by Peir-
ce and the social and political concerns raised throu-
gh the idea of  democracy as a milestone of  Dewey’s 
Pragmatic Philosophy with the Logic of  Consequences 
brought about by the legal realism of  O.W. Holmes Jr. 
The aim, then, is to critically analyze the decision of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights opening other pos-
sible alternatives to reconcile individual freedom and 
social interests.     
pers, v.5)
2 PEIRCE, Charles S. How to make our ideas clear. In: Charles S. 
Peirce Selected Writings. Edited by Philip Wiener, Dover Pu. Inc. New 
York: [S.n], 1958. p.124
3 HOLMES, Oliver W. The Common Law. Toronto: University of  
Toronto Law School, 2011. p. 5. 
2  The Pragmatic Doubt against the 
Belief on the Deductive Logic 
Argument on Court Adjudication
Peirce’s Pragmatism referred to some traditional 
methodological approaches, which have been used to 
access truth:  method of  tenacity, method of  authority 
and the a priori method for the fixation of  belief. By 
criticizing those traditional methods, Peirce proposed 
his original scientific pragmatic method, called Logic of  
Abduction, as a path to bring about believes through 
conceivable effects.  Holmes, also criticized the postu-
lates of  syllogistic deductive logic, followed the same 
steps of  Peirce, applying the Logic of  Consequences 
turned toward the analysis of  legal problems. 
The legal justification of  the decision taken by the 
European Court did not reveal the practice of  reaso-
ning, which occurs in the so called Context of  Disco-
very (Inquiry). This legal decision was strategically jus-
tified by a deductive logic, which neutralize the values, 
disputes and prejudices that involves the European tra-
dition of  Human Rights and the Islamic culture, and so, 
blinded to a more open-mind reasoning.  
The Court decided that the French Law of  “bur-
qa ban” does not violate the European Convention of  
Human Rights, because this Law ensures the conditions 
conductive to “living together” or “respect for the mini-
mum requirements of  life in society”, deductively infer-
red from the article 8 and 9 of  the Convention. 
Analyzing the legal decision,the major Premise of  
the legal reasoning were the Articles 8 (Right to respect 
for private and family life)  and 9 (Freedom of  thought, 
conscience and religion) of  the European Convention 
of  Human Rights. The Minor Premise involves the 
argument that the French prohibition of  wearing face 
coverings in public spaces ensures the conditions of  
“living together” or “respect for the minimum requi-
rements of  life in society”, prescribed by Law in Euro-
pean Convention of  Human Rights.  The Conclusion 
was that the French Law of  “burqa ban” does not vio-
late the European Convention of  Human Rights.  The 
deduction model (major premise + minor premise = 
conclusion) used in the legal reasoning of  the majo-
rity excluded the substantial part of  judicial decision-
-making process, which is the context of  discovery – 
‘how’ the decision is taken. 
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In opposition to the mentioned majority, two Judges 
(Nussberger and Jaderblom) voted against it, with the 
following arguments4:
[…] Nevertheless, we cannot share the opinion of  
the majority as, in our view, it sacrifices concrete 
individual rights guaranteed by the Convention to 
abstract principles. It is doubtful that the blanket 
ban on wearing a full-face veil in public pursues a 
legitimate aim (B). In any event, such a far-reaching 
prohibition, touching upon the right to one’s own 
cultural and religious identity, is not necessary in 
a democratic society (C). Therefore we come to 
the conclusion that there has been a violation of  
Articles 8 and 9 of  the Convention (D). [...]
Nevertheless, the majority see a legitimate aim 
in ensuring “living together”, through “the 
observance of  the minimum requirements of  life 
in society”, which is understood to be one facet 
of  the “rights and freedoms of  others” within the 
meaning of  Article 8 § 2 and Article 9 § 2 of  the 
Convention (see paragraphs 140-142). We have 
strong reservations about this approach [...]  
 In summary, the contrary conclusion of  the dissi-
dent judges goes in the following direction5:
[...] 25. In view of  this reasoning we find that the 
criminalisation of  the wearing of  a full-face veil 
is a measure which is disproportionate to the aim 
of  protecting the idea of  “living together” – an 
aim which cannot readily be reconciled with the 
Convention’s restrictive catalogue of  grounds for 
interference with basic human rights.
26.  In our view there has therefore been a violation 
of  Articles 8 and 9 of  the Convention. 
Considering the effects and the consequences of  the 
European Court decision, it is possible to justify the ar-
guments of  the dissident judges on the grounds of  the 
Philosophical Pragmatic method of  Charles Sanders 
Peirce and its logical implications. By his turn Holmes, 
following the same steps of  Peirce Pragmatism, develo-
ped his Logic of  Consequences applied to Law.  
The abduction reasoning as a logic of  mind is dri-
ven by the desire to achieve a theory (hypothesis) to 
explain the surprising facts. Applying to Law, to find the 
explanation of  a problematic legal fact, a hypothesis is 
conjectured, from where the conceivable consequences 
are inferred. 
4 Joint partly dissenting opinion of  Judges Nussberger and Jäder-
blom. In: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. S.A.S. v. 
France Judgment. Strasbourg, jul. 1, 2014. p. 61-67.
5 Joint partly dissenting opinion of  Judges Nussberger and Jäder-
blom. In: EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. S.A.S. v. 
France Judgment. Strasbourg, jul. 1, 2014. p. 66-67.
The abduction reasoning would have the following 
model (conclusion + major premise = minor premise). 
Then, in abduction, we reason from the effects to cau-
se. Therefore, the conclusion comes first anticipating 
the consequences, as an insight process where judges’ 
personality and individual bias take place. Therefore, 
the minor premise that appears in the legal inference 
is born hypothetically and submitted to inquire. If  we 
consider that anticipating the conclusion is the way the 
judge mind works, the minor premise appears as pro-
blematic, hypothetical and fallible. 
The legal pragmatic premise of  O. W. Holmes Jr., 
according to which the judge cannot solve particular ca-
ses from a general principle, clarifies the bridge between 
the philosophical logic of  pragmatism and its applica-
tion to law. As Holmes had pointed out many times, a 
dissent opinion on judgment represents an important 
mechanism to improve the legal debate and to explo-
re aspects of  the intrinsic fallibilism of  legal reasoning 
from a pragmatic perspective.
Taking into consideration the contribution of  the 
scientific pragmatic method developed by Peirce, the 
legal analysis of  the case would start with a real doubt 
and not a complete doubt in Cartesian terms. Accor-
ding to Peirce, “we cannot begin with complete doubt. 
We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually 
have when we enter upon the study of  philosophy”6. 
Applying this to the European Court of  Human Rights 
decision-making process, the doubt raised by the dis-
sident judges is a pragmatical one, inquiring whether 
the blanket ban on wearing a full-face veil in public is 
a legitimate aim of  protecting the democratic principle 
of  living together. The Court prejudices inherited 
to the decision of  the majority are, then, formally 
neutralized by a (Cartesian) maxim.  So, the process 
of  inquiry did not take place in the judicial justification 
of  the majority. Recovering Peirce words, “Let us not 
pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt 
in our hearts”7. 
Under a different perspective, Professor Just called 
attention to the European Court commitment towards 
a neutralizing justification, as a strategy to surpass the 
6 PEIRCE, Charles S. Some consequences of  four incapacities. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1934. (Collected Papers, v.5). p. 
156.
7 PEIRCE, Charles S. Some consequences of  four incapacities. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1934. (Collected Papers, v.5). p.157
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costs of  a potentially explosive decision. According to 
him, the Court validated the French law on blanket ban 
“without a single condemnatory word towards Islam” 8 .
Formally, the majority of  the Court did not face the 
main problem related to freedom of  religion, opting to 
decide based on a pre-existing normative, general de-
mocratic accepted criteria (principle of  living together), 
as a maxim to curb questions regarding Court’s political, 
ideological or philosophical preferences.  Focusing only 
in the context of  justification, the highly controversial 
nature of  the French law was easily overcome by abs-
tract assumptions.
The Pragmatic proposal allows one to explore the 
context of  discovery and inquiry as part of  legal me-
thodology, in order to improve the decision-making 
process, traditionally based exclusively on the context 
of  justification, expressed by a deductive logic.  Althou-
gh the method of  tenacity, a priori and authority have 
their merits, they limit the legal reasoning to the context 
of  justification (costless and confortable), blocking, in 
Peirce´s view, the investigation of  the practical concei-
vable effects of  the Court decision. 
The abduction of  Peirce is profoundly tied with 
the concept of  the Logic of  Consequences theorized 
by Dewey in his paper “Logical Method and Law”, on 
1924. Dewey uses the concept of  Logic of  Consequen-
ces in opposition to what he named of  Logic of  An-
tecedents of  legal reasoning, based on deduction. Ac-
cording to Dewey deduction inference does not serve 
to decide, but only to justify what has been previously 
decided by the judge. As the logic of  fixed forms, de-
duction does not involve a method able to reach intelli-
gent decisions in concrete situations, not even a method 
able to adjust legal disputes regarding rights protections 
and public interest issues. The Logic of  Antecedents 
(deductive reasoning) used by the majority of  the Court 
has acted as barriers to a more flexible interpretation of  
cultural and religious problems.
Peirce’s abduction in Science would have the same 
properties of  Dewey’s proposal to Law:  the idea un-
der which the judicial decision-making process operates 
through the logic of  investigation (abduction), where 
the judge decides based on the conceivable consequen-
8 JUST, Gustavo. Interpretative choices and objectivity-oriented 
legal discourse: a strategic analysis of  the ECtHR Ruling on the 
French Face Veil Ban. Int J Semiot Law, 2015. p. 15.  DOI 10.1007/
s11196-015-9443-8
ces of  the legal decision, adopting a logic relative to 
consequences rather than to premises. It involves a pre-
dictable, probable and future-oriented way of  thinking. 
In summary, one can observe that the European Court 
decided deductively, without considering Peirce’s advi-
ser, namely “consider what effects, which might concei-
vably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of  
our conception to have”9.
3  The grounds of the Philosophical 
Pragmatism and the fallacies 
related to the Court´s argument on 
“stimulation social interactions” in 
an open democratic society. 
Pragmatism is a pluralistic philosophy. The history 
of  pragmatism has demonstrated that one cannot find 
a single pragmatic interpretation about a great majori-
ty of  its topics, including pragmatism itself. However, 
there is a conducting wire that seems to find a common 
point of  convergence among the pragmatic thinkers - as 
one soon will see - mainly among those who integrated 
the Metaphysical Club: the scientific procedures to ap-
proach a problem.  For the sake of  clarity I have chosen 
one thinker that I do believe be the most adequate to 
the purposes of  the present analysis, without loosing 
sight of  how his methodology shares intercourses with 
his fellows.
Rigorously, we are not convinced that the human 
nature can sustained  unchangeable beliefs, even when 
they are strictly conducted by reasons extracted from 
rules of  scientific logic; much less this seems to be pos-
sible on  the field of   social and moral problems, field in 
which judicial decisions are inserted. 
Karl Popper said that the pillars which give support 
to scientific knowledge were not sink in a firm and so-
lid ground, rather in a swamp one. In this connection, as 
Charles Sanders Peirce had pointed out - imagination, crea-
tivity, art, in short, could have threshold  elements  to help 
the logic of  scientific discover make our ideas more clear, 
even without being properly true ideas. In his own words:10
9 PEIRCE, S Charles. How to Make our Ideas Clear.  In: Charles S. 
Peirce selected writings. Edited by Philip Wiener, Dover Pu. Inc. New 
York: [s.n], 1958. p.124
10 PEIRCE, S Charles, How to Make our Ideas Clear. In: Charles S. 
Peirce selected writings. Edited by Philip Wiener, Dover Pu. Inc. New 
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[…]How to give birth to those  vital and procreative 
ideas which multiply  into a thousand forms and 
diffuse  themselves everywhere, advancing a 
civilization  and making the dignity of   man, is an art 
not yet reduced to rules, but of  the secret of  which 
the history of  science  affords some hints.[…]   
Specifically, it is took for granted that, a rule of  law, 
only analytically organized, couldn’t anticipate the prac-
tical effects and consequences of  what will effectively 
happen in the future course of  experience; so, on these 
grounds, a pragmatic appraisal of  the Court’s decision 
would, in a first glance, leads to the conclusion that  the 
Burqa ban Law,  fails in maintaining – as it aims – pu-
blic safety, the stimulation social interactions, pre-
serving the continuity of  the indispensable values 
of  an open and democratic society. 
However, it seems prudent for a while, put these su-
ppositions within brackets, in order to deep the inquiry 
– under a pragmatic point of  view - in order to verify 
in what extent, if  any,  the Court took into  conside-
ration the need of  analyze and experimentally evaluate 
the alleged practical effects and possible consequences 
of  such a decision. In order to do this is important to 
first verify, what interaction means, considering the em-
phatic tone the expression “stimulating social inte-
ractions” assumes in the Court´s argumentation and 
which are its prerequisites. Interaction together with the 
principle of  continuity represent one of  the milesto-
nes of  the pragmatic philosophy of  John Dewey. Both 
are, social and political tools indispensable to exam the 
conditions of  possibility of  preserving the values of  an 
open and democratic society. They are the headlights 
which illuminate and select among experiences the ones 
which promote socially and morally growth, from tho-
se that do not. Once one is navigating on the waters 
of  law, it is important to observe how these principles 
work in connection with  legal problems. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in his known statement 
“Common Law” vehemently refuted the legal forma-
lism and its obstinate tendency to transform law into a 
oracle, endowed with the power of  anticipating  future 
consequences11:
[…]It cannot be helped, it is as it should be, that the 
law is behind the times. As law embodies beliefs that 
have translated  themselves into action, while there 
still  is doubt, while opposite convictions still keep 
York: [s.n], 1958. p. 136.
11 HOLMES JR, Oliver W. The common law. Toronto: University of  
Toronto Law School, 2011. p. 168
a battle front against each other, the time for law 
has not come; the notion destined to prevail is not 
yet entitled to the field. It is a misfortune if  a judge 
reads his conscious or unconscious  sympathy  with 
one side or the other prematurely into the law, and 
forgets that what seems to him  to be first principles 
are believed by half  fellow men to be wrong.[…] 
Holmes is the most important pragmatic thinker in 
the field of  law. More than that, he is a social scien-
tist who used law as a tool to understand the complex 
problems of  social conflict. As an empiricist, he saw 
law not as something abstract but as an instrument of  
solving conflicts. When he affirmed that “the nature of  
law is not logic but experience” he wanted to convey 
the idea that experience is plural and so, very far from 
logos, being law the witness and external deposit of  our 
moral life which follows the values of  society and not 
dictate them. Here, Holmes adhere to Dewey’s advise 
of  avoiding the use of  law as a separate entity.
The interpretations based on objective logical reaso-
ning have been largely accepted as a secure alternative 
to reach unquestionable truths. However, the price of  
this apparent formality is an inevitable separation be-
tween law and moral. Its philosophical foundations  re-
troacts to the so-called Legal Positivism, whose histori-
cal roots are first found in Hobbes and his difficulties to 
deal with moral consequences of  individual feelings of  
superiority against others on the natural state. Together 
with Austin’s interest in implementing Bentham analyti-
cal instrumentalism as an achievement of  a logical and 
universal codification, both - as Professor Kellogg12 
had suggested – offered fertile seasons to the growth 
of  Legal Positivism, later, carried forward in the twen-
ty century by the British  philosopher of  law H.L.A. 
Hart. Although one can observe some improvements in 
the Hart’s formal positivistic conception of  law, he still 
interpreted norms as logical and hypothetical comman-
ds, apart from their axiological dimensions which safe-
guard the free and practical exercise of  social behaviors.
Opposed to Hobbes assumptions that a sovereign 
should impose rules to provide security and social wel-
fare, Holmes suggests a decentralized and flexible order 
susceptible of  constant reshapes and revisions. In this 
connection, Holmes methodology is more akin with 
Peirce’s and Dewey’s communal inquiry than with the 
Aristotelian formal logic. 
12 KELLOGG, Frederic R. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., legal theory, and 
judicial restraint. Cambridge: University Press, 2007. p. 66 
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 In accordance with the pragmatic approach, future 
effects and consequences of  behaviors, require a hypo-
thetical experimental evaluation of  their future course, 
without no previous assurance that it will be or not ac-
cepted by the public. 
The impossibility of, under positivist foundations, 
promoting an organic implementation of  legal deci-
sions, leads necessarily to a second option: the mechanic 
one (Roscoe Pound refers to mechanical jurisprudence). 
The assumption of  such alternative is that freedom is 
mix up with security and the government, in order to 
maintain political stability and “social interactions”, 
must take care first of  security, in order to  control the 
use of    the second freedom.
4  The pragmatic methodology of 
Dewey’s instrumentalism and the 
heritage of Charles Sanders Peirce 
 The point of  depart of  Dewey’s political philoso-
phy and his conception of  democracy consists on the 
understanding of  how he methodologically formulated 
a theory of  values, able to avoid a bifurcation of  reason 
from experience. Such an isolation – Dewey argued - 
generates insecurity in relation to man’s aims to approa-
ch certainties. For him, the path toward the solution of  
social and politic problems has, as it major challenge, to 
find out the possibility of  better integrate beliefs to the 
world, within a scientific perspective. Or, in other wor-
ds, to frame man’s firm persuasions of  his beliefs, inclu-
ding the religious ones, within the whole human society 
by using a scientific pattern. This strategy will bring to 
light the ties which connect the philosophical investiga-
tions of  Dewey to Peirce’s methodological tenets.13     
One clear sign of  Peirce’s logic obsession for the 
study of  logic was his statement entitled “Concerning 
the Author”, inserted in 1897 in his “Collected Papers”. 
There, he declared that since the awake of  his capacity 
13 Peirce was widely considered by his fellows as the father of  
Pragmatism, notwithstanding, he himself  had recognized Nicholas 
Saint John Green - a skillful and learned lawyer - as the man who, 
in applying Alexander Bain’s definition of  belief, namely, “that upon 
which man is prepared to act” became the forerunner of  Pragma-
tism. Green, according to Peirce, was responsible for elevating Prag-
matism beyond the landing of  a mere corollary. Ironically, Peirce 
replies his above epithet suggesting that: “I am disposed to think of  
him (Green) as the grandfather of  pragmatism”. 
of  thinking and throughout no less than forty years, he 
has devoted his entire life: “diligently and incessantly 
occupied with the study of  method (of) inquiry, both 
those which have been and are pursued and those which 
ought to be pursued.”14
Looking for an expression which could best sum up 
the meaning of  his epistemological findings during tho-
se years he spent in the course of  this ripening process, 
he finally decided to designate it as “fallibilism”. Peirce’s 
conception of  falibilism presupposes that any state-
ment or belief  is potentially contaminated by a virus 
of  error, except in relation to the concept of  fallibilism 
itself. Therefore, apart from this exception, all concepts, 
no matter their origin, are, by nature, unwarranted, and 
so, continually susceptible to be revised. 
Besides, Peirce´s conception is fundamentally con-
nected with another important landmark of  the prag-
matic theory of  experience: the mentioned principle of  
continuity. Peirce15 considered the principle of  continui-
ty as the tool which gives objectification and functiona-
lity to fallibilism, once for him: 
[…]fallibilism is the doctrine  that our knowledge 
is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in 
a continuum of  uncertainty and of  indeterminacy. 
Now the doctrine of  continuity is that all things so 
swim in continua […]
It is still important to explore another facet of  
Peirce’s scientific knowledge, swinging around his cultu-
ral and intellectual knowledge. It is concerned with his 
long run intellectual career and ability of  reconciling, in 
a rich and rare combination, a great proficiency as a na-
tural scientist, together with continuous and systematic 
studies on the field of  the history of  philosophy, which 
permit him, simultaneously, as Buchler16 pointed out:
[…]critically utilize his historical study toward 
the achievement of  a imaginative depth and his 
experimental science toward the development of  
powerful logic. The striking originality of  his thought 
thus grows from a broad and solid foundation, and 
it is the product not only of  his native intellectual 
genius but of  his moral conviction that philosophy 
must build as well as repair.
The application of  the principle of  continuity as a 
14 PHILOSOPHICAL writings of  Peirce: selected and edited by 
Justus Buchler. New York: Dover Publications, 1955. p.1
15 PEIRCE, Charles S. Synechism, fallibilism, and evolution. In: 
Philosophical writings of  Peirce. Edited by Justus Buchler. New York: 
Dover Publication, 1955. p.356. 
16 BUCHLER, Justus. Introduction. In: Philosophical writings of  Pei-
rce. New York, Dover Publication, 1955. p. 9
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fundamental category of  Dewey’s philosophical instru-
mentalism is considerably owned, to Peirce’s methodo-
logical overture which motivated Dewey17 to use it as a 
lever for investigating changes in nature, being it physi-
cal, social or moral. 
However, it is important as well to insert here a pa-
renthesis, in order to point out that, apart from Peirce’s 
influence, the idea of  continuity in Dewey’s thought, 
retroacted to his early graduate studies, through the in-
fluence of  Hegel’s philosophy, which, according to him, 
first and definitely sediment his conception of  conti-
nuity as an existential trait of  nature and the motor of  
inquiring.
In an article entitled “From Absolutism to Experi-
mentalism” of  1930, Dewey18 declared that apart from 
his later drifts from Hegelian idealism he never igno-
red and much less denying what an astute critic had 
affirmed about Hegel’s influence on his philosophical 
conceptions, namely that: “Hegel has left a permanent 
deposit in my thinking”19, and concluded, “I still should 
believe that there is greater richness and greater varie-
ty of  insights in Hegel than in other single systematic 
philosopher”20. Then, it seems appropriate to state that 
in this context continuity, in Dewey’s realistic and natu-
ralistic philosophy, is a category which partially criticizes 
and gives support to his original idealistic tenets.
5  Peirce and Dewey’s falibilism under 
a comparative view
  If  the pragmatists in general, mainly the fellows 
of  the Boston’s Metaphysical Club, tried to settled their 
methodological investigations, taking Peirce’s logic pos-
tulates as a point of  depart of  their philosophical analy-
sis - Dewey, in spite of  the alleged idealistic residues left 
17 DEWEY, John. The quest for certainty. New York: Gifford Lec-
tures, 1929. p. 18 
18 DEWEY, John. From absolutism to experimentalism. In: The 
later works. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston.  Illinois: Southern Illinois 
University, 1984. p.147-160. (v.5, 1929-1930)
19 DEWEY, John. From absolutism to experimentalism apud RUS-
SEL, Bertrand. Dewey’s New Logic. In: The library of  living philoso-
phers: the philosophy of  John Dewey. Editor Paul A. Schilpp. Illinois: 
Illinois University, 1971. p. 138.
20 DEWEY, John. From absolutism to experimentalism. In: The 
later works. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston.  Illinois: Southern Illinois 
University, 1984. p. 154. (v.5, 1929-1930)
in his mind by the Hegelian conceptions - was not an 
exception. 
To illustrate how some of  these ties were sized, one 
could invoke Peirce’s major concern with a paramount 
logical canon, which he explained in one of  his most 
famous papers: “How to Make our Ideas Clear”. There, 
he pointed out the principles he considered fundamen-
tal to push thought to a higher grade of  clearness whi-
ch goes beyond the canons of  the traditional logic. For 
him, thought, in a scientific perspective, has as a sole 
function to produce beliefs; what goes beyond this, he 
asserted, belongs to other systems of  relations.
If  then, the role of  thought is generates beliefs, con-
sequently, it has as its leitmotif  the attainment of  thou-
ght at rest; and whatever does not refer  to belief  is no 
part of  the thought. So, in searching for answering what 
a belief  really is, Peirce21 defined it as follows:
[…]It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical 
phrase in the symphony of  our intellectual life. We 
have seen that it has just three properties: First, it is 
something  that we are aware of; second, it appeases 
the irritation of  doubt; and third, it involves the 
establishment  in our nature  of  a rule of  action, 
or, say in short, a habit  As it appeases  the irritation 
of  doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought 
relaxes and comes to rest for a moment when belief  
is reached. But since belief  is a rule for action, 
the application of  which involves further doubt 
and further thought, at the same time that it is a 
stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for 
thought. That is why I have permitted myself  to 
call it thought at rest, although thought is essentially 
an action.[…]
Dewey’s conception of  thought as an instrument for 
reconstructing human experiences analogically pushes 
knowledge, in order to reconcile it with  Peirce’s premi-
se that the function of  thought is to pursue beliefs; as 
Peirce, Dewey considered thought a restless instrument 
to deal with an universe full of  uncertainties, risks, chal-
lenges in which human intelligence has constantly and 
interminably to deal with for surpassing  its conflicts 
and try to change human habits accordingly; in a conti-
nue search for settling problematic situations man aims 
to transform them into renewed and more enduring 
and richer experiences. 
However, if  one looks now for some distinctions 
between Peirce and Dewey, it would be appropriate to 
21 PEIRCE, Charles S. How to Make our Ideas Clear. In: Selected 
writings: values in an universe of  Chance. Edited by Philip P. Wiener. 
New York: Dover Publication, 1958. p.28-9 
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call attention that, even though Dewey essentially had 
used Peirce’s conception of  thought as a tool for action, 
there is a   subtle difference in the direction they metho-
dologically used it. So, while Peirce, as a natural scien-
tist, was mainly devoted to explain the relevance of  the 
methodological procedures to the scientific inquiry in 
general, Dewey, as a cultural philosopher, was occupied 
and preoccupied with emphatically use  Peirce’s prag-
matic logic directing it to moral and political problems, 
as well as with the role of  democracy in their social ar-
rangements.
However, this does not mean that Peirce was com-
pletely immune to the role of  his logic and its possible 
application to the sphere of  moral problems.  He also 
believed that man, is naturally inclined to seek for ideals, 
whose aims are to make stead his own beliefs; howe-
ver– he advised – it is very important that he must be 
aware about the steps he follows to  make such choi-
ces, transforming them in beliefs whose consequences 
and effects could be empirically tested. Because, if  he 
takes his ideals strictly as a categorical, fixed and un-
changing expression of  a necessary moral development 
he will slide down on a pitfall which makes him divert, 
or blocking the way to perceive the logical consequen-
ces of  his inquiry. For this reason, to access knowledge 
adequately requires a kind of  Socratic and modest atti-
tude which leads man to renounce the sin of  yielding 
fancies to arrive to truly convictions. So, when he stoi-
cally accepts his own limitations before a world plenty 
of  uncertainties he realizes that “fallibilism” is a pre-
-condition of  pragmatic inquiry which requires a kind 
of  altruistic logic begging for a servitude of  thought, 
in front of  a world of  chances.  Allegorically, would be 
possible to accept Peirce’s advise as the real available 
possibility of  man to free himself  from the fetters of  
alleged dogmatic truths.
Connected with these moral beliefs concerns, it is 
seasonable to bring into consideration a reference Peir-
ce made to moral beliefs as related to religious convic-
tions. Here, he stretched the boundaries of  his fallibilis-
tic conceptions out to religious problems.  
Peirce argued that Protestants considered flesh and 
blood as elements of  the sacrament only in a figurative 
sense, while the Catholics literally accept them just as 
they were meat and blood, notwithstanding they also 
admit their additional sensible qualities. But, Peirce 
said, “It is foolish for Catholic and Protestants to fancy 
themselves in disagreement about the elements of  the 
sacrament, if  they agree in regard to all their sensible 
effects, here or hereafter.”22 
This argument demonstrates that, whatever concept 
we have in our minds of  an object, it will correspond 
to its sensible effects; so, it is a mere caprice, a whim, to 
admit any other possibility, except if  we deceive men-
tally mix up a fancy’s thought  as a part of  the thought 
itself. It is just on the basis of  such an argumentation 
that Peirce arrived to his conception of  what the con-
cept of  an object means (see above section 2).
6  Outlines of the concepts of 
continuity, interaction and 
fallibilism in the social philosophy 
of John Dewey
Regarding Peirce’s fallibilism and its methodological 
applications, some considerations related to Dewey’s 
use of  the principle of  continuity sized up to his con-
cept of  a social experience to select intelligently  their 
qualitative effects, deserve additional remarks. 
 In an article entitled “”Experience, Knowledge and 
Value” Dewey23 started searching for definitions of  
“truth” related to, inquiry, continuity and the defeat of  
man’s beliefs in unchangeable truths. He affirmed :
[…]The ‘truth’ of  any present proposition, is, by 
definition, subject of  the outcome of  continued 
inquiries; its ‘truth’, if  the word must be used, is 
provisional.; as near the truth as inquiry has as yet 
come, a matter determined not by a guess at some 
future belief  but by the care and pains with which 
inquiry has been conducted up to present time. 
Admission of  the necessary subjection of  every 
present proposition to the result to be obtained in 
future inquiry is the meaning of  Peirce’s reference 
to confession of  inaccuracy and one-sidedness as an 
ingredient of  the truth of  a present proposition.[…]
In a footnote to the above quotation Dewey reinfor-
ced his allegiance to Peirce’s principle of  fallibilism and 
his emphasis upon its inherent notion of  probability 
which affects all kinds of  experience. 
22 PEIRCE, Charles S. How to Make our Ideas Clear. In: Selected 
writings: values in an universe of  Chance. Edited by Philip P. Wiener. 
New York: Dover Publication, 1958. p.124.
23 DEWEY, John. Experience, knowledge and values. In: The life of  
the living philosophers: the Philosophy of  John Dewey. Edited by Paul 
A. Schilpp. Illinois: Open Court Pu, 1971. p.573. v.1 
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 Experiences, he thought, may stir up curiosity, 
wishful thinking, intentions which may drive a person 
for future projects as an attempt to materialize his ho-
pes. However, each experience being a moving force, its 
value will depend on the direction it is settled in motion. 
Therefore, both philosophically and pedagogically, to 
deal intelligently with experiences –presuppose a careful 
evaluation of  the directions the experiences would take. 
A no less important requisite to deal with them is that 
they do not occur only within a person. It is important 
to acknowledge that all human experiences are shared 
ones, in other words, they are, by nature,   social. 
The social character of  experience is a kind of  mo-
ral experience, an attitude of  discernment, let’s one say, 
form of  practical wisdom overt to a critical examina-
tion. Its function is, then, to select attitudes akin with a 
lived and moral continuation of  the individual and social 
growth, apart from those which go in reverse direction. 
So, experience comprises two different, even though 
inseparable dimensions:  objective experiences and sub-
jective ones. They are not separated, much less oppo-
sed. But they require a certain equilibrium in such way 
that, neither internal dispositions (individual impulses) 
should prevail over the social objectives and environ-
mental conditions, nor the late must imperialistically 
impose its external strength to the former. 
Again, the instrumental pragmatic logic of  Dewey 
interprets knowing as a form of  doing, so that the ob-
jects of  knowledge are consequences of  operations 
performed by man, and not a pure consequence of  an 
illuminated reason, bestowed with self-sufficiency. 
Being knowledge operational in Dewey’s instru-
mentalism, it is directly connected with the logic of  the 
scientific investigation. Its function then is instrumen-
tal in the sense it provides a balance, a kind of  middle 
term between subjective and objective conditions of  
knowledge, between knowing and the known. This di-
mension of  social knowledge, requires communication, 
which corresponds to the second fundamental principle 
of  Dewey’s interpretation of  experience, namely: the 
principle of  interaction.
Therefore, both continuity and interaction act as 
twins, born of  the same birth sharing the pragmatic for-
mulation of  the human knowledge.  According to him24:
24 DEWEY, John. Experience and Education. New York: Kappa Del-
ta Pi, 1938. p. 44-5
[…]The two principles of  continuity and interaction 
are not separate from each other. They intercept 
and unite. They are, so to speak, the longitudinal 
and lateral aspects of  experience. Different 
situations succeed one another. But because of  the 
principle of  continuity something is carried over 
from the earlier to the later ones. As an individual 
passes from one situation to another, his world, 
his environment, expands and contracts. He does 
not find himself  living in another world but in a 
different part or aspect of  the same world. What he 
has learned in the way of  knowledge and skill in one 
situation becomes an instrument of  understanding 
and dealing effectively with the situations which 
follow. The process goes on as long as life and 
learning continue.[…]
Dewey explored epistemologically the connections 
between the scientific knowledge and social politic pro-
blems digging their roots in the history of  the western 
culture. He found that since the Greek tradition there 
was a division between knowledge and belief. Such a 
division was originally owned to the historical changes 
from religion to philosophy. Through it, imagination 
and emotion were treated under the lights of  a rational 
discourse, submitted to the canons of  the formal logic. 
In “The Quest for Certainty” Dewey recognized that 
believes follow two distinct paths: “He has beliefs about 
actual existences and the course of  the events, and he 
has beliefs about ends to be striven for, policies to be 
adopted, goods to be attained and evils to be averted.” 25
He considered an urgent practical problem to find 
a possibility of  reconciling and connecting these two 
beliefs: “How shall our most authentic and dependable 
cognitive beliefs be used to regulate our practical belie-
fs? How shall the later serve to organize and integrate 
our intellectual beliefs?” 26 
7  Dewey’s integrated view of religious 
and democratic beliefs 
Now the philosophy of  John Dewey will be drive 
to religious beliefs as connected with the idea of  de-
mocracy. Different from his fellow William James, who 
interpreted religious life on the lens of  individual va-
lues, Dewey saw it as a moral, social and educational 
25 DEWEY, John. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Gifford Lec-
tures, 1929. p. 18
26 DEWEY, John. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Gifford Lec-
tures, 1929. p. 18
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phenomenon.  So, they become instruments to develop 
imaginative relations turned toward man and his social 
ideals. Dewey’s all-around logic, supported by a theory 
of  experience is immerged in the whole cultural envi-
ronment, searching for a set of  ideas, beliefs and inte-
llectual and social, moral and religious  attitudes with 
which individuals could cope with the real world.
How, then, to reconcile the experimentalism and 
its pragmatic cornerstone: the scientific method, with 
fields like ethical and religious?   This would be possi-
ble, if  one takes for granted that religious have moral 
consequences and effects, analogous to any other social 
behaviors. So, the wire system which moves social ex-
periences, moves as well, the religious ones. Interlaced 
and embracing all these social, political and moral and 
religious experiences come forth the idea of  democracy.
 Dewey’s cultural philosophy reputes indispensable 
that the moving energy which direct all human expe-
riences are irradiated by certain moral binds which, as a 
cement, which ethically concretizes social interactions. 
This cement is democracy. Human beings would have 
no meaning at all, except if  it conveys the intimate and 
vital connection of  democracy to man’s life. According 
to him27:
[…]We cannot continue the idea that human 
nature when left to itself, when freed from external 
arbitrary restrictions, will tend to the production of  
democratic institutions that worked successfully. 
We have now to state the issue from the other 
side.  We have to see that democracy  means the 
belief  that humanistic culture should prevail; we 
should be frank and open in our recognition that 
the proposition is a moral one –like any idea that 
concerns what should be.(…) No matter how 
uniform and constant  human nature is in the 
abstract, the conditions within which and upon 
which  it operates have changed so greatly since 
political democracy was established among us, 
that democracy cannot now depend upon or 
be expressed in political institutions alone. We 
cannot even be certain that they and their legal 
accompaniments are actually democratic at the 
present time – for democracy is expressed in the 
attitudes of  human beings and is measured by 
consequences produced in their lives. 
And in his book The Public and its Problems, he 
proceeded28:
27 DEWEY, John. Democracy and human nature. In: Freedom and 
culture. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939. p. 124-125
28 DEWEY, John. The public and its problems. Chicago: Gateway 
Books, 1946. p.  148
[…]Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an 
alternative to other principles of  associated life. It 
is the idea of  community life itself. It is an ideal 
in the only intelligible sense of  an ideal: namely, 
the tendency and movement of  some thing which 
exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, 
perfected.[…]
In order to fulfill such a desideratum, Education (one 
of  the cornerstones of  Dewey´s democracy) is the so-
cial formula able to adjust a citizen’s conduct as a mem-
ber of  a political group to actively participate, as a free 
and responsible individual, of  the family life, industry 
and commercial activities, scientific, artistic and reli-
gious practices.
Dewey’s pragmatic naturalist view of  religiosity as 
exposed in “A Common Faith”, implies that religious 
experiences could be analyzed, as any other types of  
experiences. So, they are analogously susceptible to a 
pragmatic inquiry, once, religious phenomena exists in 
us as a fruit of  our ideals beliefs. Therefore, there is 
no reason to consider them mystical experiences, 
emanated from a superior divine power, but as ano-
ther type of  natural manifestation of  experience. 
As he said29:         
[…]On the contrary, there is every reason to 
suppose that, in some degree of  intensity, they 
occur so frequently that they may be regarded as 
normal manifestations that take place at certain 
rhythmic points in the movement of  experience.
Religious attitudes are, by the same token, commit-
ted with the realization of  the democracy as a vital mo-
ral and spiritual human ideal. If  democracy prevails, we 
no longer are compelled to be reduced to a mechanical 
model. As he pointed out30:
[…] Whether or no we are, save in some 
metaphorical sense all brothers, we are at least all in 
the same boat traversing the same turbulent ocean. 
The potential religious significance of  this fact is 
infinite.     
Another important question now arises: how it is 
possible interpret the turmoil of  modernity through 
the lights of  the dialectical and contradictory conflicts 
between the development of  science and technology, 
commerce and arts, and the needs of  a democratic 
community? How to deal with this problem beyond 
national frontiers? which agreements and methods of  
29 DEWEY, John. A common faith. [S.l]: Yale University Press, 1991. 
p.37
30 DEWEY, John. A common faith. [S.l]: Yale University Press, 1991. 
p.55
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cooperation and interactions would promote common 
shares among peoples and nations? 
Contrasting with these imperative requirements, one 
could observe a permanent feeling of  hostility and belli-
gerence between nations and cultures. Morally, each sta-
te takes for granted its own values and interests, acting 
as the supreme judge of  its own interests. As a matter 
of  fact, politically, it seems that no substantive shift has 
happened – except for worse – comparing the length of  
time between Dewey`s description of  this conflicting 
status quo and the present days. The remedy Dewey31 
prescribed for those alleged social illness is democracy. 
And the condition and essence of  a democratic gover-
nment is education:
[…]The devotion of  democracy to education is a 
familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a 
government resting upon popular suffrage cannot 
be successful unless those who elect and who obey 
their governors are educated. Since a democratic 
society repudiates the principle of  external 
authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary 
disposition and interest; these can be created only 
by education. But there is a deeper explanation. A 
democracy is more than a form of  government; it is 
primarily  a mode of  associated living, of  conjoint 
communicated experience.[…]
8  Dewey pragmatic method and 
law; religious and democratic 
implications 
Dewey was not indifferent to the issue of  how me-
thodologically to deal with legal problems. By contrary, 
in spite of  not being a technical lawyer he had exhaus-
tively treated the philosophical issues which lay behind 
law practices.
To the purpose of  the present analysis it was selec-
ted one of  his sharpest statements in which the logic 
and methodological implications and applications of  
Pragmatism could be adjusted to law decisions: “Logi-
cal Method and Law”. It will be  analyzed in confront 
with the alleged Court decision. 
 Holmes affirmed that the language of  judicial deci-
sion is mainly the language of  logic, longing for repose 
and certainty; however, certainty, in general, is an illu-
31 DEWEY, John. Democracy and education. New York: The Free 
Press, 1966. p.87
sion: “The actual life of  the law –he said – has not been 
logic; it has been experience.” 
Dewey understood correctly Holmes criticisms to 
this legal conception of  logic: one of  rigid certainties in 
which, every demonstrative or strictly logical conclusion 
subsumes a particular under an appropriate universal. 
It is a syllogistic logic, opposed to a pragmatic logic of  
inquiry.
 Dewey illustrated analogically how the actual logic 
reasoning has managed legal problems, using the clas-
sical syllogism of  the mortality of  Socrates, as a neces-
sary deduction of  the major premise that all men are 
mortal. The syllogistic logic -Dewey argued – pretends 
erroneously to prove that  logic is only concerned with 
the results of thinking, but not with its operations. 
Besides, Holmes statement that: “General proposi-
tions do not decide concrete cases.”, was endorsed by 
Dewey on the grounds that: “No concrete proposition, 
that is to say one with its subject-matter dated in time 
and placed in space, follows from any general state-
ments nor from  any combination of  them however 
‘logical it may be.”32 
Dewey was entirely convinced that a pragmatic logic 
of  operations applied to all empirical phenomena is pri-
marily connected with intelligent ways of  making deci-
sions. Since the territory of  law belongs to the realm of  
experience, so its investigations should be submitted to 
the same logical rules. 
Moving now toward the problem of  passing legisla-
tion, having as one of  its components, religious beliefs 
in a multicultural perspective - as occur in the present 
case – requires to examine to what extent, the Bur-
qa band legislation would or not, be compatible with 
Dewey´s philosophic conception of  democracy related 
to law, religious, and social and political  behaviors?
From the arguments developed by Dewey, it is pos-
sible to infer that in cultural terms, one cannot separate 
political, social, educational and philosophical problems 
one from the other. Since Dewey interpret these pro-
blems through the light of  a multidisciplinary perspec-
tive, the principles of  continuity and interaction serve 
as instruments to connect them.  The majority decision 
on the case SAS v. France was fragmented, as Just33 had 
32 DEWEY, John. Logical Method and Law. The philosophical review, 
v. 33, n. 3, 1924. p. 566.
33 JUST, Gustavo. Interpretative choices and objectivity-oriented 
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pointed out, once religious and cultural dimensions re-
lated to the problem were not take into consideration 
through a syllogistic reasoning, which was supported by 
deductive inferences from general assumptions. 
9 Conclusive remarks
An interpretation of  the cultural background on 
which Law has been historically understood, interpre-
ted and applied in Europe will be now discussed. The 
legacy of  European culture played an important role in 
the social, moral intellectual, and political fields, to pro-
mote man´s freedom, economic progress, philosophical 
scientific and technological developments, artistic and 
aesthetic creativity. All these deeds have served as an 
evidence of  the unavailable treasure it bestowed to the 
whole western civilization. However, on the other hand, 
and in spite of  all these advancements, social and racial 
prejudices, wars, religious intolerances have intermitten-
tly acted as barriers against these great conquests. In 
analyzing these antagonistic tendencies under a social-
-psychological perspective, some pragmatic insights 
would help to understand better the nature of  such a 
conflicting dualism. 
The roots of  these contradictory behaviors and in-
consistencies are mainly illustrated through the Euro-
pean colonization of  aboriginal cultures of  the New 
World. The strength of  this discriminatory and vio-
lent  process seems, still today, to weigh in the minds 
and hearts of  people from the old Continent, bringing 
psychologically and socially to the surface conflicts be-
tween habits of  a past heritage of  domination and vio-
lence,  and the social political and democratic conquests 
of  modernity. 
In Law, the concern with this dualism would not 
be absent. And the most comforting way of  get rid of  
this schizophrenic dilemma seems to be look for an 
epistemological shelter which rationally surpass those 
contradictions. The already mentioned Legal Positivism 
seems to be a glove to fit perfectly to promote the ai-
med security through a rhetoric based upon deductive 
logical arguments; as a matter of  fact, it  attempts crea-
te an artificial equilibrium, a middle term between the 
legal discourse: a strategic analysis of  the ECtHR Ruling on the 
French Face Veil Ban. Int J Semiot Law, 2015. p. 1-18.  DOI 10.1007/
s11196-015-9443-8
old fashioned mechanic concept of  authority and the 
modern flexible idea of  democracy. Here, the meaning 
of  social interactions consists on a combination of  the 
acceptance of  certain liberties, to the expense of  con-
trolling others considered “undesirable” and “dange-
rous”; but, on the end, the real aim seems to be to secu-
re the social order and preserve the juridical system of  
the State and not to promote free and open interactions. 
The consequence is that within a same society one has 
two opposed types of  behavior, corresponding to two 
different types of  individuals.  
Dewey’s concept of  interaction rejected individual 
behaviors, as something insulated but along and in con-
nection with the behaviors of  others. Dewey’s concept 
of  interaction also refused the idea that knowledge is 
the only privileged mode of  accessing reality owned to 
its superiority in relation to practical activities. In this 
connection, social decisions are intellectual, participa-
tive and are not an isolated. Besides, intellectual judg-
ments are complex in the sense that they involve senti-
ments, affections, values and hopes.   
Although the foundations of  majority the European 
Court were supported by logic tenets, which provides a 
Positivist deductive way of  reasoning, it goes apart from 
a real living logic of  experience, and the analysis of  its 
effects and consequences, as developed by the Philoso-
phical Pragmatism of  Peirce and Dewey and the legal 
realism of  Holmes Jr. 
The concepts of  continuity and interaction in 
Dewey´s philosophy help to better understand what 
should be the meaning of  “living together in a demo-
cratic society”. It is important to point out how the con-
cept of  continuity and democratic interaction proposed 
by John Dewey, comes closer to the grounds of  the dis-
sent opinion, then from the decision of  the majority of  
the Court. 
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